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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the
STATE OF UTAH
PACIFIC COAST TITLE
\
INSURANCE COMPANY,
a corporation,
I
Plaintiff and Respondent, I
vs.
> Case No. 8719
HARTFORD ACCIDENT &
INDEMNITY COMPANY,
\
a corporation,
I
Defendant and Appellant I
ANSWER OF PACIFIC COAST TITLE
INSURANCE COMPANY TO PETITION
OF HARTFORD ACCIDENT & INDEMNITY
COMPANY
The appellant herein, Hartford, has filed a
Petition for Rehearing. Respondent, Pacific Coast
Title Insurance Company hereby answers said Petitition and alleges:
1. There can be no misapprehension of facts
in this case as the parties stipulated as to
almost every material fact in this particular case.
2. Every item mentioned and argued by Hartl
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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3.

ford in its Petition for Rehearing has been
covered by the briefs of counsel, in the oral
argument and considered by the court,
The opinion of the Court is consistent with
the applicable law of contracts.

BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF ANSWER
POINT I.
THERE CAN BE NO MISAPPREHENSION OF
FACTS IN THIS CASE AS THE PARTIES STIPULATED TO ALMOST EVERY MATERIAL FACT IN
THIS PARTICULAR CASE.

Appellant apparently overlooked the Stipulation of Facts in this case (R. 11-13) page 9 to 12
of the Title Company Brief. The 15 stipulated facts
form a complete basis for the cause of action asserted by the Title Company and sustained by the
court. The undisputed testimony of Mr. Mark D.
Eggertsen further established that because work
had been started on the project and basements dug
before a single mortgage was recorded,, the bond
was required to protect the Title Company against
the potential liens of materialmen. (See pages 12
and 13 of Title Company brief).
Hartford implies that the Court has "misunderstood or misconceived" some of the facts. It appears
that Hartford is contesting the semantics of the
opinion rather than the justice and wisdom thereof.
By quoting a few minor excerpts from the body of
2
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the opinion, Hartford in its Point I has sniped at
the opinion without covering some basic factors.
The burden of Hartford's complaint seems to
be, now that the extensions of time, variations of
payment procedures and other beneficial rearrangements have been accomplished between Cassady,
Felt, Prudential and Associated Accountants, such
are not binding upon Hartford and in effect protanto varied the basic contract so Hartford could
slide out from under its surety obligation. (Note:
No change or aggregate of changes and alterations
increased the contract price up to 10%).
Paragraph 6 of the Contract Bond at issue
reads:
"6. The prior written approval of SURETY shall be required with regard to any
changes or alterations in said contract where
the cost thereof, added to prior changes or
alterations, causes the aggregate cost of all
changes and alterations to exceed 10 per cent
of the original contract price; but, except as
to the foregoing, any alterations which may
be made in the terms of the contract, or in
the work to be done under it, or the giving by
the Obligee of any extension of time for the
performance of the contract, or any other forbearance on the part of either the Obligees
or PRINCIPAL to the other, shall not in any
way release SURETY or PRINCIPAL of the
obligations of this instrument, notice of SURETY of any such alterations, extensions, or
forbearance being hereby waived."
3
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Thus the inevitable re-adjustments, extensions
of time, changes, alterations, etc. were anticipated.
Upon such a premise, it was agreed that no notice
of such alterations need be given to Hartford of the
changes and extensions such as were contained in
the February 16, 1951 modification. Therefore, the
endorsement of that February 16th Supplemental
Agreement was unnecessary, but nevertheless Hartford did endorse it without any repudiation and the
trial court found (Finding No. 30):
"Hartford had full knowledge of the contents and purposes of said Supplemental
Agreement of February 16, 1951 (PR 8) and
upon presentation of the Agreement to it,
Hartford did not repudiate or reject it, but
affirmatively consented to the amendment of
certain provisions of the several agreements
affected by said Supplemental Agreement as
herein particularly described. No changes or
alterations in said contract dated July 19,
1950 between Syndicate and Cassady (PR 2)
as amended were made whereby the cost of
the project added to prior changes and alterations, caused the aggregate cost of all changes and alterations to exceed 10% of the original contract price, nor was such a change
effected by the Supplemental Agreement of
February 16, 1951 (PR 6) or by any other
agreement between Syndicate and Cassady.
There were no changes or alterations in the
Contract of July 19, 1950 (PR 2) which in
aggregate exceeded 10% of the original contract price."
4
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The court is again referred to the Title Company's original brief as Respondent for a more complete statement of our position.
POINT II.
EVERY ITEM MENTIONED AND ARGUED BY
HARTFORD IN ITS PETITION FOR REHEARING HAS
BEEN COVERED BY THE BRIEFS OF COUNSEL, IN
THE ORAL ARGUMENT AND CONSIDERED BY THE
COURT.
POINT III.
THE OPINION OF THE COURT IS CONSISTENT
WITH THE APPLICABLE LAW OF CONTRACTS.

The Stipulation of Facts in this Title Company
case, coupled with the court's Findings pertinent
thereto, form a solid groundwork for the Opinion
of this court. It is to be noted that no direct attack
is made upon anything done by the Title Company,
nor is there any claim of any failure of performance on the part of the Title Company.
To succeed in overthrowing the Findings and
Judgment of the trial court and the well-considered
Opinion of this court, Hartford must rely upon a
few minor breaches by Felt. Briefs heretofore filed
have emphasized the sanctity of Findings supported
by evidence and the policy of sustaining the liability
of a compensated surety. Let us take a look at Finding No. 39 by the trial court:
"Felt Syndicate, Inc. did not breach its
5
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contractual obligations to Cassady or to Hartford in any substantial manner and any differences between them were resolved by extensions of time granted to Cassady Company,
Inc., and by the Supplemental Agreement between the parties entered February 16,1951."
Early in the court's history its policy as to petitions for rehearing was announced.
No rehearing will be granted where nothing
new and important is offered for consideration,
(emphasis ours)
Ducheneau v. House
4 Ut. 483,11 Pac. 618
Cummings v. Nielson
42 Ut. 157, 129 Pac. 619
"To justify a rehearing a strong case
must be made. The Supreme Court must be
convinced either that it failed to consider some
material point in the case, that it erred in its
conclusions, or that some matter has been
discovered which was unknown at the time
of original hearing. In re McKnight, 4 U. 237,
9 P. 299; Brown v. Pickard, 4 U. 292, 9 P.
573, 11 P. 512."
The whole basic concept of the problems in this
litigation was comprehended by the court and reflected in its unanimous opinion. This respondent
was designated as "title obligee" in the bond for
the reason that it would not and did not rely upon
the contractor but insisted upon a bond to protect
it from loss. Hartford undertook that obligation.
6
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A loss ensued and now that compensated surety is
asking relief from the very obligation which it was
paid to assume. Again we believe that the court will
rebuff such a prayer.
Appellant initially contended that the Title
Company could not recover under the bond because
its damages (attorneys fees and costs) were not
recoverable under the language of the Contract
Bond. This contention now has been abandoned as
not one word of criticism of the decision in this
respect is found in Hartford's petition for rehearing or the accompanying brief.
Hartford, as appellant, has reverted to one
theme, the claimed breaches by Felt bar all recovery
by the Title Company. We again reiterate the position argued in our brief on appeal, that such a strict
and ruthless interpretation of the Contract Bond is
contrary to well established rules of law and equity.
It is entirely true, as appellant claims, that it
argued the "escape" clause and we answered that
contention in the original briefs in this case. We
knew that Hartford's only hope for a way out of
its liability was via that phrase. We also knew and
recognized that such a narrow, punitive, forfeiture
clause could not be construed as Hartford desired
if the normal rules of construction were applied.
The court did read those briefs and hear the
arguments of counsel thereon. It therefor ill be7
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comes the appellant to now claim that the court did
not "consider the principal contention asserted by
Hartford for reversal of the judgment below." There
is no duty imposed upon an appellate court to analyze, disect and repeat every contention of an unsuccessful appellant.
The opinion clearly shows that the court read,
heard and understood appellants oft repeated plea
under the escape clause, as the cou^t P.aid:
"The principal basis of Hartford's attack upon the judgments is that the plaintiffs
themselves were guilty of breaches of their
contractual duties, which prevented its principal, Cassady, from performing his obligations. Inasmuch as the trial court found in
favor of the plaintiffs, they are entitled to
have us review the evidence and every reasonable inference fairly to be drawn therefrom
in the light most favorable to them."
WHEREFORE, Respondent, Title Company,
prays that the Petition for Rehearing be denied, and
that the case be remanded to the trial court upon
the basis of the opinion as now published by the
court.
Respectfully submitted,
HARRY D. PUGSLEY
PUGSLEY, HAYES & RAMPTON
Attorneys for Respondent,
Pacific Coast Title Insurance
Company
8
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

